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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

T .AXATION-!NCOME T AX:-EXEMPT REORGANIZATIONS-RECAPITALIZATION AS DEVICE FoR DISTRIBUTING EARNINGS-Petitioner owned more
than three-fourths of the stock in a corporation whose shares had a par value
of $ IOO. · Except for one share, his wife owned the remainder. Under a plan
of recapitalization the stockholders received in exchange for each old share,
five shares of no par stock with a stated value of $60 per share plus a portion
of $400,000 worth of callable debentures issued by the corporation. At the
tim.e of this exchange the earned surplus of the corporation exceeded $850,000.
The commissioner held that the full value of the debentures received was
chargeable to the taxpayer as income. The Tax Court agreed, although the
corporation had complied with the literal tenp~ of the statute, something more,
a legitimate corporate purpose, was needed before the transaction could qualify
as a tax exempt reorganization.1 The circuit court of appeals affirmed the

1 "No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a
party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged
solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to
the reorganization." 26 U.S.C. (1940) § II2 (b) (3).
"The term reorganization means: •••• (E) a recapitalization ••••"Id.,§ II2
(g) (I),
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decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed, two justices
dissenting. The reorganization was not one which obtained the privileges afforded by section II2 (g). Bazley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (U.S.
I947) 67 s. Ct. I489. 2
Frequently, tax payers, by literally complying with the provisions of section II2 (g), have demonstrated its vulnerability to tax avoidance schemes. The
courts, however, have prevented the frustration of the section by judicial legislation. For example, prior to 1934 the statutory definition of one type of reorganization required a transfer by a corporation of a majority of its stock or of
substantially all of its assets, but made no provision as to the consideration which
was to be received from the transferee.a The courts supplemented the statute
by implying the condition, that the consideration represent a "continuity of
interest." 4 Thus notes and bonds were held not to satisfy the requirement. 5
A condition that the consideration must give the transferor a definite and
material interest in the purchaser and also represent a substantial value' of the
assets transferred was also invoked to fortify the section.6 In Gregory v. Helvering1 the court announced yet another judicial restriction: the reorganization ,
must be for a business or corporate purpose. It would seem that the Court,
in the principal case, has extended the doctrine of the Gregory case. For there
the reorganization was illusory; the corporation, which was created merely to
comply with the reorganization requirements, was immediately dissolved after
it had served its purpose.a Here the reorganization was at least real in the sense
2
A companion case, Adams v. Commissioner, was disposed of along with the
principal case. There, too, the issuance of debenture bonds in a recapitalization was
treated as a distribution of the corporation's accumulated earnings. The Court also
stated: "The findings by the Tax Court that the reorganization had no purpose other
than to achieve the distribution of the earnings is unaffected· by the bookkeeping
detail of leaving the surplus account unaffected."
a Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1g26, § 203 (h)(1); Revenue Acts of 1928 and
1932, § 112 (i)(1).
4
Brookes, "The Continuity of Interest Test in. Reorganizations-a Blessing or
a Curse," 34 CALL. REv. I (1946); 49 YALE L. J. 1079 (1940); 3 MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 20.54 (1942).
5
Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 53 S. Ct. 257
(1933); Cortland Speciality Co. v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1932) 60 F. (2d)
937, cert. den., 288 U.S. 599, 53 S. Ct. 316 (1933); Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308
U.S. 415, 60 S. Ct. 313 (1940).
6
Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 56 S. Ct. 269 (1935).
7
293 U.S. 465, 55 St. Ct. 266 (1935). This case was decided under the 1928
Revenue Act. Section 112 (i)(1)(B) defined one form of reorganization as, "a
transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders both are in control of
the corporation to which the assets are transferred." The section was complied with
in the following manner. A corporation wholly owned by the taxpayer transferred
1000 shares of stock in B corporation to a newly created corporation C, which then
issued all of its shares to the taxpayer. Within a few days the taxpayer dissolved corporation C and on liquidation received the 1000 shares of B stock. The court held
that while the plan conformed to the term 'of the statute there was no reorganization
within the intent of the statute.
8
ln Chisholm v. C.I.R., (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 14 at 15, Judge Learned
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that the corporation has continued to operate in its changed form. But it would
seem that the extension is justified, for the only purpose of the reorganization
was to conceal the trail of a dividend to the taxpayer. The corporation was in
no better position to conduct its affairs after this recapitalization. The net result
was that it's earned surplus had been reduced by $400,000 with no resulting
benefit. The stockholders bene:fitted, for without reducing their equity in the
corporation, they had received corporate obligations which were of value. They
were even callable, which tends to point to a sham transaction and justifies
labelling the debentures "dividends," for the taxpayer controlled the corporation and could convert them to cash at any time. As a second ground for its
decision, the court stated, in effect, that these callable debentures were not
securities within the meaning of section II 2 (b) (3). 9 Since the court referred
to Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford,1° it is submitted that the debentures
would also be taxable as dividends under section I I 2 ( c) ( 2). Therefore, even
though adhering to the rule of the Dobson case,11 and accepting the Tax Court's
finding of fact that a recapitalization is for a legjtimate corporate purpose, the
. Supreme Court will still scrutinize the transaction to see if the corporate obligations are sec;urities. It would seem th'at only obligations which do not too
closely resemble cash would be considered securities in a situation such as that
presented by the principal case.12
Bayard E. Heath, S.Ed.

Hand said in referring to the Gregory case: " ••• the incorporators adopted the
usual form for creating business corporations; but their intent, or purpose, was merely
_to draught the papers, in fact not to create corporations as the court understood that
word. That was the purpose which defeated their exemption, not the accompanying
purpose to escape taxation; that purpose was legally neutral. Had they really meant
to conduct a business by means of the two reorganized companies, they would have
escaped whatever other aim they might have had, whether to avoid taxes, or to regenerate the world."
~ See note I, supra.
19 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 65
S.Ct. 1157 (1945). In this case a distribution of cash out of earning and profits of a
corporation, pursuant to a recapitalization which was a reorganization as defined by
section 112 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1936 was held to have had the effect of the
distribution of a taxable dividend within the meaning of section II2 (c) (2).
11 Dobson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239
(1943).
.
I
12 In Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387, 56 S. Ct. 275 (1935), stockholders
,
owning all of the shares of corporation A exchanged them for stock in corporation B
arid mortgage bonds of corporation A guaranteed by corporation B. The maturity
dates of the bonds varied from two months to seven years. Held, the bonds were
securities. In LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 60 S. Ct. 313 (1940), the Court
held that an exchange of bonds alone did not constitute a reorganization because of
1

